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BOOK REVIEW

The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in
America. By Jeffrey Rosen. New York, New York: Random
House, 2000. Pp. 274. Hardcover. $24.95.
Reviewed by Michael Carney*

While the right of privacy has long played a role in the
law, its modern development owes much to the 1890 article
by Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren in which they
characterize it, famously, as the right "to be let alone."' Yet
since that time its development has taken a circuitous route
through the Constitution in the series of cases, leading to Roe
v. Wade,2 in which the Supreme Court, with an inscrutable
logic, came to see it as the right to make choices about
reproduction. A more promising, and fruitful, line of inquiry
is taken by Jeffrey Rosen in his recent book, The Unwanted
Gaze: The Destructionof Privacy in America.
In his book Rosen develops a conception of privacy as a
process of controlling what information we allow others to
know about us, revealing more or less depending on the
context and the relationship:
Privacy protects us from being misdefined and judged out
of context in a world of short attentions spans, a world in
which information can easily be confused with knowledge.
True knowledge of another person is the culmination of a
slow process of mutual revelation. It requires the gradual
setting aside of social masks, the incremental building of
* J.D., University of San Francisco School of Law; M.A., University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee; B.M., Southern Methodist University. The author
practices civil litigation in San Francisco.
1. Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193, 195 (1890).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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trust, which leads to the exchange of personal disclosures.3
Sometimes, though, we imprudently or carelessly disclose
personal information, or others invade our privacy and obtain
that information on their own. The harm depends on the
recipient:
When intimate personal information circulates among a
small group of people who know us well, its significance
can be weighed against other aspects of our personality
and character. By contrast, when intimate information is
removed from its original context and revealed to
strangers, we are vulnerable to being misjudged on the
basis of our most embarrassing, and therefore most
memorable, tastes and preferences....
[W]hen our
reading habits or private e-mails are exposed to strangers,
we may be reduced, in the public eye, to nothing more
than the most salacious book we once read or the most
vulgar joke we once told.4
With this conception as his point of departure, Rosen
examines privacy in a number of different contexts, from our
privacy rights in our personal papers and diaries, to the
consequences of employer monitoring of workplace e-mail and
Internet use. He then considers how hostile environment
sexual harassment law threatens to do more harm than good,
aided by amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, and
he suggests that tort law can better address the harm that
hostile environment law seeks to regulate; finally he looks at
how privacy on the Internet is eroding, and how that erosion
might be mitigated.
In chapter one, Rosen considers how the legal framework
that protects basic personal property from search and seizure
has eroded, opening up to public scrutiny things that most
regard as fundamentally private, one's papers and diaries.
The locus of the right to privacy in one's personal effects is
the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which
provides in part that "persons, houses, papers, and effects"
are protected against unreasonable searches and seizures.'
Historically, the guiding principal regarding privacy in our
papers and effects was that "mere evidence" of guilt could not

3.

JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY

IN AMERICA 8 (2000).

4. Id. at 9.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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be seized by the government in criminal cases; only items
clearly related to the criminal behavior, namely fruits,
instrumentalities, or contraband, were subject to search and
seizure.' This principal had been followed in the United
States until the Supreme Court, in Warden v. Hayden,7
eliminated the distinction by allowing the seizure of what was
formerly "mere evidence." Now that category is fair game.
For example, when Bob Packwood, the senator from Oregon,
became embroiled in the ethics investigation concerning
sexual advances he had been accused of making towards
former employees and lobbyists, his diaries, which he
admitted contained entries of the alleged encounters, were
subpoenaed as part of the investigation.8 The humiliation of
the disclosure was only compounded when unrelated excerpts
were published in the Washington Post.9
The injury that such disclosures cause, in Rosen's view, is
a "breaching of boundaries: information that might be
appropriate to share with friends or acquaintances has been
The
taken out of context and exposed to the world."'1
published excerpts had nothing to do with the allegations, but
instead concerned his observations on domestic life, food, his
favorite supermarket, among other things." Rosen sees the
harm here in Packwood being judged by others based on what
was intended for personal reflection but had been publicly
wrenched out of context. As a remedy to such invasions by
the press, Rosen considers the four torts for invasions of
privacy familiar to all law students: appropriation of name or
likeness, false light, intrusion upon seclusion, and public
disclosure of private facts. 2 While the latter two have the
most utility in protecting privacy here, that utility is limited
since it is a defense to such claims that the matters disclosed
are newsworthy." Another barrier Rosen notes is that the
publication must be "highly offensive to a reasonable person."
However, given our culture's taste for the salacious, few could
probably agree on what would offend the privacy sensibilities
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See ROSEN, supra note 3, at 30.
387 U.S. 294 (1967).
See ROSEN, supra note 3, at 31.
See id. at 40.
Id. at 41.
See id.
See id. at 45.
See id. at 48.
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of a "reasonable person." 4
Probably of more immediate interest to many is the
subject of the second chapter, the erosion of privacy in the
workplace occasioned by employer monitoring of employee email and web browsing. E-mail is especially prone to being
taken out of context because of its very nature: it is easy to
retrieve and hard to delete, and it lacks the contextual
accompaniments of tone, voice, facial expression, and can
often be misunderstood unless the recipient has some
familiarity with the sender. 5
Further, since it is often
written quickly and sent immediately without the
opportunity for second thoughts that ordinary mail provides,
it may not always be fully accurate. 6
To understand employers' motivation in monitoring
employees' e-mail and web browsing, Rosen examines a
number of Supreme Court decisions tracing the evolution of
Fourth Amendment interpretation. 7 Katz v. United States 8
announced the now-familiar test that the Fourth Amendment
protections apply when there is a subjective expectation of
privacy that is reasonable. 9
The problem with this
formulation, Rosen observes, is that as technology allows
increasingly intrusive surveillance, expectations of privacy
have diminished, reducing Fourth Amendment protection.' °
This led to O'Connor v. Ortega," which held that public
employees may have an expectation of privacy in their offices,
desks, and file cabinets, but that such expectation "may be
reduced by virtue of actual office practices and
procedures. . . ."" This has had the perverse effect of causing
employers to more frequently search private areas of the
workplace in order to decrease their employees' expectation of
privacy. 3 The lowered expectation of privacy opens the door
to increased monitoring. The motive, then, for e-mail and
web monitoring is readily apparent: because, as Rosen

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See ROSEN, supra note 3, at 53.
See id. at 75.
See id.
See id. at 58-63, 71-72.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
See ROSEN, supra note 3, at 60.
See id. at 61.
480 U.S. 709 (1987).
ROSEN, supra note 3, at 68 (quoting O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 717-20).
See id. at 70.
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explains, employers bear the brunt of sexual harassment
liability, they have an incentive to reduce exposure by
regularly monitoring e-mail and web browsing in order to
identify and eliminate communications that might contribute
to "hostile environment" sexual harassment liability.24
What is lost, Rosen contends, is the "backstage" area
where employees can relax, joke, and interact informally free
from official scrutiny.25 Pointing out that a good deal of
workers' e-mail is unrelated to work, Rosen suggests that
companies and universities could recapture some of the
privacy lost by setting aside e-mail accounts and network
areas to host backstage interaction free from monitoring
unless there was cause to suspect misconduct.2 6
The centerpiece of the book is Rosen's analysis, in the
third chapter, of sexual harassment law and the
consequences it has had on privacy. The roots of sexual
harassment law are found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which makes it illegal to, among other things,
"discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."27 From this, two forms of sexual harassment
have been recognized: quid pro quo, encompassing the "sleep
with me or you're fired" threat,28 and hostile environment.
The hostile environment test was first endorsed by the
Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 9 and
addresses itself towards "unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature" that "has the purpose or effect
of... creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.""
Rosen believes that the hostile environment test blurs
"the boundaries between public and private spheres":
By allowing women (or men) to complain about any
sexually oriented speech or conduct that they found
24. See id. at

79-80.

25. See id. at 89.
26. See id. at 90.
27. Id. at 95 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994)).
28. See ROSEN, supra note 3, at 13.

29. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
30. ROSEN, supra note 3, at 13 (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at
65).
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hostile or abusive, the new test allowed aggrieved
coworkers to object to overheard jokes and to e-mail,
suggestive pictures, or even their colleagues' consensual
flirtation, even if the men in question never intended their
conduct to be offensive, and the woman to whom the
conduct was directed didn't perceive it as offensive. 3'
This problem is especially acute in cases involving consensual
sexual relationships between supervisors and employees.
One example Rosen discusses is a suit brought by a former
editor at Spin magazine who sued its publisher, Bob
Guccione, Jr., for sexual favoritism, alleging that he passed
her over for promotion in favor of women in the workplace
who slept or flirted with him. 3'
This led to invasive
investigations into the private lives of a number of women
whom the plaintiff said had been favored, as she attempted to
explain promotions and assignments by reference to the
sexual dynamic of the workplace.33
The result is that a body of law intended to protect the
privacy and dignity of men and women has had the effect of
invading the privacy of innocent third parties.34 Given the
inherently vague nature of the hostile environment test,
reasonable persons will disagree whether a pattern of conduct
in the workplace rises to the level of discrimination,
especially where there really are no tangible employment
consequences to point to.3 The solution, Rosen argues, is to
eliminate the hostile environment test in favor of the invasion
of privacy torts. He explains that certain behavior and
speech, while perhaps offensive, are not properly regulated by
sexual harassment law, since they threaten no retaliation,
nor change the terms and conditions of employment.3 6 It is
simply boorish.
Such behavior-"unwanted advances,
suggestive looks and gestures, sexual joking and teasing, and
the display of sexually explicit material"-is better
understood as an invasion of privacy.
Yet there appears to be a lacuna in Rosen's argument
here: while the invasions of privacy he discusses throughout
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 107.
See id. at 91.
See id. at 91-92.
See id. at 94.
See id. at 101-02, 112-13.
See ROSEN, supra note 3, at 112-13.
See id. at 112-13, 115.
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the book concern information that we generate which is either
taken from us (as by legally compelled production of our
papers or e-mail or information about our sexual habits) or
which we freely give but then is used by others (as when our
web browsing records are used for targeted advertising), it is
nevertheless information that we have created, and in that
sense it is accurate. When we are then judged out of context
on that basis, Rosen's conception shows its explanatory
utility: something true about us is distorted, overblown, and
while true, nevertheless misrepresents us; our privacy is
indeed invaded. However, when we are subjected to boorish
behavior, the information that is taken out of context does not
originate with us, rather, it is attributed to us and we have
nothing to do with its creation. Being subjected to unwanted
sexual banter or coarse humor, for example, at worse means
that someone might think we appreciate it or do the same
ourselves. Thus, it is difficult to see how, on Rosen's view of
privacy, there can be any invasion of privacy from merely
boorish behavior: while being judged out of context may be
injurious, the harm is only to one's dignity and not to one's
privacy because the information upon which such judgment is
made is not ours.
Nevertheless, where the conduct in question does invade
privacy, Rosen makes a good case for the relative benefits of
the "tort versus hostile environment" approach. In particular,
the invasive discovery and investigation that hostile
environment litigation engenders would be limited, because
the torts focus on harm to the individual making it difficult
for third parties to object to sexual jokes, banter, and
distasteful postings.38 The requirement that the conduct be
"highly offensive" to a reasonable person would tend to weed
39
Most
out boorish behavior from actionable conduct.
the
on
responsibility
important, the tort model places
perpetrator, not the employer, removing a considerable
incentive to litigation, and allowing a concomitant decrease in
employer monitoring.4" Rosen argues that this would restore
the balance between privacy and transparency in the
workplace, allowing the private spaces that workers need to

38. See id. at 121.
39. See id. at 120.
40. See id. at 122.
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express themselves and relax to be reconstructed.4 '
It can be questioned whether Rosen's suggested shift
away from the hostile environment theory of sexual
harassment towards a tort regime has any more than a
theoretical appeal. Employers would welcome the reduction
in liability exposure, yet the opposing interests of potential
litigants and the plaintiffs bar might prove that trimming
Title VII (also known as the "Lawyers Full Employment Act")
in such a way is more easily done in the abstract. But these
are political issues that really have no bearing on the
analytical merit of Rosen's proposal. Further, while Rosen's
proposal seems to leave an entire class of litigants without a
ready legal remedy-those who cannot prove quid pro quo
harassment or tortious invasion of privacy-there should be
no mistake that Rosen's proposal is better than the
alternative: the remedy for boorish behavior is social
disapproval, not litigation that invades rather than protects
privacy.
Facilitating the invasions of privacy caused by the hostile
environment theory of sexual harassment are amendments to
the Federal Rules of Evidence allowing evidence of personal
sexual history to be admissible in cases involving sexual
harassment.
In chapter four Rosen describes how,
traditionally, the rules of evidence did not allow admission of
evidence of an accused's sexual past, which was seen as too
prejudicial, yet at the same time allowed admission of
evidence of the accuser's past as evidence of consent.42 To
counter the perceived unfairness of allowing inquiry into the
accused's sexual past without allowing inquiry into the
accuser's, the rules were amended.43 The amendments,
however, eventually effected a complete reversal of the
traditional rules, opening inquiry into the accused's past
while closing inquiry as to the accuser.44
For instance, Rosen argues that Paula Jones's sexual
harassment suit against President Bill Clinton shows how a
legally questionable allegation of harassment can, through
the rules of evidence, invade the privacy of innocent third

41.
42.
43.
44.

See
See
See
See

id. at 122-23.
ROSEN, supra note 3, at 133.
id.
id. at 134, 136.
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parties.45 In the suit, Jones had alleged that Clinton granted
employment benefits to women who succumbed to his
advances while denying benefits to her because she rejected
his advances." In order to prove this her lawyers sought
certain information about all the women with whom Clinton
had "sexual relations" leading up to the alleged hotel
exposure." Among those women was Monica Lewinsky,
whose plight later played out notoriously in the Kenneth
Starr investigation. Rosen believes that the violations of
Lewinsky's privacy could have been avoided had Jones
instead sued Clinton for invasion of privacy, which he
contends would have been summarily dismissed. Even if it
had not, discovery would have been more narrow and less
invasive, focusing on Clinton's treatment of Jones, and not
third parties.48 Ultimately, Rosen suggests, the privacy of the
accused should be brought back into balance by amending the
Federal Rules of Evidence to give accused harassers the same
protections as their accusers.49
The last chapter shifts away from sexual harassment law
to examine the loss of privacy on the Internet, while
considering the ways our electronic privacy might be rebuilt.
Rosen illustrates just how serious the consequences of this
loss of privacy can be through the example of the dean of the
Harvard Divinity School who was forced out of his position
once it was discovered that he had downloaded pornography
from the Internet onto his home computer." Previously, the
dean had requested that a university computer with greater
memory be brought to his home, and while the Harvard
technician was transferring files from the dean's home
computer to the new one, the technician noticed that the dean
had saved thousands of pornographic pictures.5" Even though
the downloading was done at home on his home computer,
once this information became public, the university asked
45. See id. at 150. The suit grew out of Clinton allegedly exposing himself
to Jones; later the complaint was amended to add an allegation of contact
bringing it within the scope of a "sexual assault" under the new Federal Rule of
Evidence 415; thus, opening up Clinton's sexual past. See id. at 130-31.
46. See id. at 150.
47. See id. at 151.
48. See ROSEN, supra note 3, at 154.
49. See id. at 155.
50. See id. at 159.
51. See id.
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him to resign.
Rather than being a wholly private activity, Rosen
explains that the dean's case demonstrates how public our
Internet reading habits have become, since anyone with
access to our computer (especially in educational and
workplace settings) can simply review our computer caches,
Internet history files, and cookies." The greatest threat to
Internet privacy, Rosen believes, comes from the "electronic
footprints" we leave as we search and browse the web,
leading, for example, to "the unsettling experience some
Internet users have had of being bombarded with targeted
ads after expressing an interest in a particular topic."5 As
this information is amassed and recorded, the danger of it
being taken out of context increases.5 4 The solution, Rosen
argues, lies in technologies such as the various modes of email encryption55 and web browsing anonymity providers,
some of which are unable, by design, to link users with their
data streams. 6 Where issues of authentication arise, in
shopping for example, rather than indiscriminately disclosing
information, Rosen suggests that digital certificates could
conceal our ultimate identity while revealing sufficient,
selected authenticating information. 7 Rosen believes that
these technologies, and not the law, are the most promising
way to protect online privacy, since legislative attempts have
largely languished due to the opposition of corporate
marketers, insurers, law enforcement, and health care
interests. 8
Rosen concludes
with an examination of the
consequences the erosion of privacy has in the political, social,
and personal spheres. In the political sphere, the loss of
privacy occasioned when political differences are fought
through the "revelation, investigation and prosecution" of
individuals, inhibits deliberation and fosters partisan

52. See id. at 161.
53. Id. at 163.
54. See ROSEN, supra note 3, at 194.
55. See, e.g., id. at 173-74.
56. See, e.g., id. at 173-77. The president of Anonymizer.com told Rosen
that "Our strategy is to be technologically unable to cooperate with subpoenas."
Id. at 175.
57. See id. at 177-79.
58. See id. at 170-71.
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extremism.5 9 In the social sphere, such as public and private
workplaces, surveillance and monitoring increase anxiety and
6
lower productivity, while injuring personal dignity. ' And in
the personal sphere, our ability to form intimate relationships
is compromised when we lose the ability to control the
disclosure of personal information.6 '
Rosen's work is wide ranging and provides a thoughtful
analysis of privacy from a number of different perspectives,
both legal and non-legal. His conception of privacy as a
regulation of personal information allows him to show that
privacy concerns more than the right "to be let alone"; it plays
an important role in how we shape our identities and
relationships.

59. See id. 210-12.
60. See ROSEN, supra note 3, at 212-15.

61. See id. at 215-16.

